Annex 2: Non-Extractive Stakeholders Focus Group Meeting
Group profile
The stakeholder groups represented at the meeting were:
- Water Rights Trust
- NZ Salmon Anglers Association (x2)
- Council of Recreational User Groups
- Forest and Bird (x2)
- Various kayaker/ fishing/ whitewater rafting/ conservation interests (x1)
- Fish and Game.
Apologies were received from kayaking/canoeing interests.
Issues
- Surface water degradation
- Groundwater degradation
- Sufficient quality and quantity for fish and fishing
- Appropriate land use
- Interpretation of laws by councils
- Prioritisation of water for extraction over rights of other users
- Development must be allowed, but the rights of the water body must come first
- Freshwater is a commons
- Overemphasis on use in the RMA as opposed to protection of other values
- Need for greater recognition of in-stream values
- Extraction should be a privilege not a right
- With rights goes responsibility, particularly for compliance
- Current allocation system is a dog's breakfast and not meeting anyone's needs
- Lack of measurement of the resource and its use
Summary
The group was predominantly associated with users, and with fishing interests in particular. However there was significant representation from those with an interest in protection of ecological values specifically, and of all non extractive values in general. The group expressed significant dissatisfaction with the roles of regulatory agencies.
How does the group see its rights in the water resource
The group generally saw itself as having few recognised rights in the resource. While some of the user interests felt that there was adequate protection of ecological interests through the minimum flow regime, most felt that this aspect was protected at an absolute minimum and that scientific evidence, particularly new developments, were not well reflected in flow regimes. The interests of amenity users of the resource were considered to have a very low level of rights accorded under the existing regime. This was expressed in two ways:
- The first was that the other users of the resource were in fact the "existing users", and subsequent users were encroaching on their rights. This encroachment or attenuation of their rights was occurring without any compensation.
- The second stream saw that there was a common property right in the resource, and that the common right should have at least equal, if not higher priority.
There was a strong feeling in the group that they did have a right in the resource but that this right was not currently reflected in allocation. One member noted that:
"... rather than our right being recognised by councils, we have to go out and fight for them at every step of the way."
How does the group view the rights of extractors?
The group generally saw the extractors as having very strong rights under the current allocation regime. As an example a member cited the fact that at any of the resource consent renewal hearings they had attended, all the consents had been renewed. The Act is seen to be applied as if the consents are automatically renewable. Several of the group considered that extractors saw themselves as having the primary right to the resource.
Specific concerns with extractors' rights were issues such as overwatering and wastage, particularly the issue of irrigating during northwest winds, and allowing irrigation water to overflow the races and run across the roads as evidence of wastage.
However most of the discussion in this section focused on problems with information and allocation regimes. There was seen to be a lack of adequate planning which takes into account the non-extractive stakeholder rights. Consent authorities were seen ass continuing to grant consents despite not knowing the effects, and not adopting the precautionary principle. The group generally considered that the authorities should be much more conservative in their approach until the effects of the abstractions were better known.
There was considerable discussion about the inadequacy of the planning regimes in the councils. Granting of consents in the absence of a catchment or aquifer plan was affecting the rights of other users and the ecological value of the resources. Furthermore catchment planning was seen as a way of providing for the existing users or common property in the resource, which would mean that each individual consent did not have to be contested to protect those rights.
Issues surrounding the nature of the property right
This group was not questioned regarding all the characteristics of property rights. The duration and certainty, flexibility, and transferability characteristics were discussed.
Duration and certainty
There were mixed views on this. In general there was opposition to an increase in duration and certainty under current planning regimes and with current scientific understanding of the resource. There was a general feeling that consents should be limited to 10 years, and scepticism of the ECan regime of 35 year consents with potential for change at any time, because in practice the changes were not being made to the consent conditions.
However when questioned further in a hypothetical situation where these elements could be eliminated, there was a split in the group. Some were comfortable with this provided that the resource could be well specified and the right was described as a proportion of an allocated block, which could itself change. However even under these circumstances the appropriate term was seen as only up to 35 years because of scientific uncertainty and changes in climate etc. Most remained sceptical that the system would work because of scientific uncertainty.
Others were philosophically opposed to an increase in security for the consent holders - in terms of duration or certainty. They saw political dangers in this because it would consolidate extractors' rights, and this would lead to greater leverage over the allocation process. Ultimately this would lead to adverse results for the common property rights in the resource.
One participant recognised the need for sufficient certainty to allow the consent holder to recover the investment in obtaining the consent and setting up the irrigation system, but felt that 10 years should be sufficient for this.
Flexibility
The stakeholders were tested about this by being asked what concerns they would have if the water was able to be put to any purpose the consent holder saw fit. This again saw a diversity of views in the group. Some were very concerned about this concept, because it was seen as allowing intensification of land use and inefficient use of the water. Even under a scenario where the land use was controlled by some other means, these people remained concerned - primarily because of scepticism that land use would be adequately controlled under other mechanisms such as district plans. There was a comment that while the idea was nice, the downside risk was too great and the pre-cautionary principle should apply.
An alternate point of view was put though that essentially the in stream users had no interest in what happened to the water once it had been abstracted. This person considered that in fact increases in efficiency were actually adversely affecting their interests, because this meant that more land was able to be irrigated with the available resource leading to an increase area under intensive agriculture and ultimately adverse impacts on their interest in water resources. The group discussed this point of view, and most were in agreement. The group decided that increases in efficiency should result in water being returned to the river or aquifer allocation rather than resulting in an increased area being irrigated.
Transferability
Again there were a diversity of views on this. These could be characterised as:
- no objection - see this as a way for the water to flow to the highest value use, and provided the outcomes are protected in terms of the abstracted and receiving resources this system would work well
- qualified support - would see that this system could produce some benefits, but would be opposed to people getting the resource for free initially, and that if this were introduced some payment would have to be made for the consent - either initially or as an ongoing rental
- concerns about the adverse consequences of a market system. Comparisons were made with the electricity markets, which weren't seen as benefiting the consumers, and with the fishery markets, which saw an aggregation of resources. Comments about "water barons" and people buying water and leasing it out, thereby making a living without doing anything. There were also concerns that the transfer of water would undermine land use rules
- philosophical opposition to the water being owned. This point of view was that the water is a common resource, incapable of ownership. Any water that is not needed by the consent holder should be returned to the regulatory authority.
Other issues
There was concern expressed by the group about the growing community divisions that were being brought about by the adversarial system that is currently operating for management of the water resource. They see that central government should be stepping in and having a greater say in the management of the resource and resolving issues. It was noted that departments which could be doing this are probably constrained from doing so because of their political masters.
It was noted that rights in the resource come from money. The extractors can afford to hire lawyers and experts to make their case and contest adverse decisions because they make money from the resource. It is very difficult for the other stakeholders to effectively represent the opposite point of view. This is money = rights approach is seen as occurring because the rules for managing the resources are not clear.
An increase in security must come with payment for the resource.
Summary
- There was a clear consensus that the stakeholders had a right in the resource, which was expressed in different ways. All felt that this right was not being adequately recognised in the allocation process.
- There was a clear consensus that the extractors have a very secure property right, and in fact their rights were too secure given the condition and understanding of the resources.
- There was a clear consensus that the main property rights issues were inadequate understanding of the resources, inadequate planning including allowing for the common property/existing use rights, and continued allocation for abstraction in the absence of that understanding and planning.
- There was a clear consensus that under current conditions property rights for abstractors should not be made more secure. There was a divergence of views as to whether, in an ideal world, property rights for abstractors could be increased. Concerns about this included the political consequences of entrenching these rights and increasing the political leverage of abstractors, concerns about the practical consequences, and philosophical objections to the resource being owned.
