6. Relating Hazard Knowledge & Risk Perception to Impacts and Readiness

The data is presented in Appendix 5 and summarized and discussed in the subsections below.

An important aspect of hazard preparedness is people's perceptions in terms of their 'outcome expectancy' and 'self-efficacy'. Outcome expectancy describes the level to which people believe that their personal actions will be capable of mitigating risk, and self-efficacy whether they believe that they are competent to carry out risk reduction measures and to act effectively deal with the consequences of hazardous events. Self-efficacy particularly seems to affect the diversity of action plans that people will develop, as well as their effort and perseverance in carrying out risk reduction activities. Plan development is an important factor, as hazards occur only rarely and household reduction and readiness activities need to be sustained over prolonged periods of time. These factors, and their relationship to risk reduction behavior, are described as a model in Figure 10. This model (Paton 2003; Paton et al. 2001; Paton et al. 2003) was derived from an empirical examination of earthquake and flood readiness in New Zealand and provides a framework for analysing hazard reduction and readiness activities and for planning future hazard awareness initiatives.

The model (Fig. 10) illustrates the relationship between people's perception of risk and their behaviour to reduce the hazard. People make assumptions about whether successful outcomes are possible before they form an intention to adopt readiness measures. The model also illustrates the factors that risk reduction strategies must address to promote and sustain readiness. For example, irrespective of the level of perceived risk, people are unlikely to formulate intentions to act if they think the hazard risk is insurmountable (low outcome expectancy) or believe they do not have the competence to act (low self-efficacy).

Even when intentions are formed, they may not be acted on. Whether intentions are converted to actions depends upon people's interpretation of their past experiences, their response efficacy (appraisal of whether they have the time, resources, skills and social networks required for adoption), their sense of community (feelings of attachment for people and places), and whether they accept personal responsibility for the safety of themselves and others (Ballantyne et al. 2000, Bishop et al. 2000, Duval & Mulilis 1999, Lindell & Whitney 2000, Paton et al. 2000).

Three inter-related issues are examined in this section-one concerns the degree of preparedness of residents for flooding, the second concerns the role of their prior knowledge and experience, and the third concerns the role of warnings in affecting behaviour. The suddenness of occurrence of weather bomb phenomena highlight the need for preparedness-even with very good warnings, unprepared households will be particularly vulnerable to losses and adverse outcomes. Consequently, we first examine levels of preparedness. Questions were asked about the levels of respondent's preparedness prior to this event and about activities they have undertaken since the weather bomb occurred.

Firstly, what was the level of preparedness for flooding prior to this event? Overall, the levels of preparedness were low. Only 5 % of the respondents had raised the floor, 44 % had kept ditches and drains clean, 11 % had protected septic tanks, and 22 % avoided keeping valuables at ground floor levels. One possible reason for this low level of preparedness is people's lack of prior experience of floods. Overall, only some 22 % of respondents had prior experience of floods, particularly repeat experiences. Some activities, such as structurally altering the home by raising floor levels, could also be discounted on the ground of cost. Some 55 % of respondents cited cost as a significant constraint on carrying out hazard preparation activities.

The next question concerns changes in the level of preparedness that can be attributed to having experienced the weather bomb. Overall, some 74 % of respondents cited the weather bomb event as the worst incidence of flooding they had experienced. Direct experience of losses or awareness of potential losses (e.g., from first-hand accounts of neighbours, media reporting etc.) could be expected to have triggered better preparedness. However, the experience appears to have had little significant influence on preparedness. When respondents were asked about levels of preparedness instigated by the weather bomb experience, some 20 % reported taking out insurance, 3 % raising floor levels, 37 % ensuring ditches were kept clean, 9 % protecting septic tanks, and 27 % avoiding keeping valuables on the ground floor.

This is a significant finding. If direct and indirect experience of a threatening event does little to encourage preparedness, what chances are there that more traditional public education programs will be successful in facilitating better preparedness? The next stage in the process is to identify reasons for this outcome. This will be analysed within the context of the empirically tested process model introduced above (Paton et al. 2003). The use of a theoretically rigorous and empirically tested model facilitates the identification of areas where risk reduction strategies can be implemented and applied to public hazard education.

Preparedness intentions form the starting point for this analysis. Intentions are important precursors to actual preparedness-within the model (Paton et al. 2003) there is an important distinction between the intention to seek information and intentions to act. These are discrete elements-the intentions to seek information represents an end point and does not lead to actual preparedness. Risk reduction will thus be indicated by the proportion of respondents who indicate an intention to prepare. Restricting discussion to only those who responded in the affirmative, overall, only 4 % signaled an intention to prepare, whereas 29 % signaled an intention to seek information. This finding suggests a need to work back through the process to define levels of variables that predict intention to prepare. This subsequent analysis is conducted within the above model (Paton et al. 2003).

According to the model, the preparedness process is triggered by high levels of two variables-'perceived threat' and 'critical awareness'. While the content of perceived threat is self evident, critical awareness requires some explanation. Research into the effective precursors of community action has highlighted the importance of the level of perceived salience-how critical or important an issue is for people. Specifically, unless people see an problem as salient, it is unlikely to motivate action. One measure of the level of perceived salience is the amount of time that people spend talking and thinking about an issue.

In the present sample, the mean levels of critical awareness was 5.44 (range 2-10, median, 6), indicating that awareness is present at moderate levels. The strong direct and indirect influence that this variable has on intention to prepare makes it particularly important. The level of critical awareness present in this sample indicates a need for future risk communication strategies to increase the degree to which people see flooding issues as salient or important within their everyday lives.

The second precursor variable is the extent to which respondents attribute a level of threat to a specific hazard, such as flooding. In this sample, the mean level of perceived threat was 5.25 (range 2-10, median, 6), indicating only a moderate to low level of perceived threat. The low level of perceived threat by respondents in this sample indicates a need for future risk communication strategies to increase the degree to which people see flooding as a threat to significant aspects of their lives.

The data on critical awareness and perceived threat indicate only moderate levels of motivation to carry out risk reduction or preparedness measures. People's levels of critical awareness and perceived threat also may be reduced by other factors. Despite the severity of the weather bomb, large losses were not widespread and those experiencing loss reported generally positive experiences with their insurers. Overall, of those who made damage claims on their insurers (137 respondents), some 91 % reported a positive outcome. This may have the effect of reducing the impact of the losses, and therefore the salience of flooding, for this group. A follow-up survey would be required to investigate this aspect in more detail. Another factor influencing levels of this variable is the incidence of involvement in community groups (within which discussion occurs and ideas are obtained), which is at low to moderate levels. Overall, 44 % of respondents report no involvement in community groups, although this ranges from 18 % in the Coromandel 'high impact' area, 55 % in the Coromandel 'low impact' area, 69 % in South Waikato, and 72 % among Coromandel bach owners. Attempts to increase the salience of flooding may not represent a cost-effective use of resources. However, attempts to increase participation in community groups may help in this regard.

Attempts to influence preparedness through changing people's perceptions of the threat may prove more fruitful. For example, a substantial proportion of respondents across the areas surveyed reported not having seen a flood hazard map. While a substantial majority in the Coromandel 'high impact' area had seen this information, 82 % of respondents in South Waikato, 72 % in the Coromandel 'low impact' area, and 83 % of the Coromandel batch owners group had not seen it. These data suggest that the effective dissemination of this information could enhance levels of threat perception.

Note, however, that critical awareness is more important in instigating preparedness, so the level of change in preparedness that could be expected from merely increasing people's perception of the threat remains low. More detailed, systematic analysis of the content of the discussions and cognitions regarding flooding could furnish the information required to analyse the salience of hazard issues. This would require that systematic, structured interviews were conducted with respondents to articulate the beliefs and cognitions that predict their intentions.

The second important group of factors are those that are responsible for converting motivation into intentions. Key factors here are outcome expectancy and self efficacy. The conversion of motivation into intentions requires that people believe that the effects of hazards are amenable to mitigation through their personal action (outcome expectancy). However, even if that belief is present, people may not act if they do not think they are competent to carry out the appropriate actions (low self efficacy). For example, media coverage and documentaries about flooding often focus on their catastrophic nature and destructive potential. If such perceptions are internalised, a person, even if motivated to do something about a problem, may not progress any further.

In the present sample, the mean level of outcome expectancy was 13 (range 4-20, median, 12), indicating its presence at a moderate level. This level indicates that future risk communication strategies need to increase the degree to which people see that the consequences of flooding can be reduced through their personal actions. Risk communication strategies should thus focus on specific effects of a given hazard and on concrete reduction or preparatory measures that can be taken to mitigate them.

In addition to low preparedness intentions being linked to low outcome expectancy, an additional constraint is the self efficacy of respondents. In this sample, the mean level of self efficacy was 10.2 (range 4-20, median, 12), which are low to moderate levels. These levels indicate a need for future risk reduction strategies or community development strategies to enhance self efficacy. Manipulation of levels of self efficacy is more difficult. It involves engaging people in activities in which they are responsible for defining and managing problems within their community. Pursuing this approach requires links between emergency management and community development agencies. It should be noted that a potential constraint on pursuing this option is people's attitudes to cooperating with others. The data suggest that respondents were split in regard to their willingness to engage in cooperative risk reduction strategies. That is, while some 39 % were favourable towards working with other community members, the same proportion (39 %) were opposed to adopting this approach.

An additional concern for future risk communication are the factors that affect whether people perceive themselves as legitimate targets for risk communication efforts. One key aspect is unrealistic optimism bias-this is a tendency for people to perceive themselves as less vulnerable and/or more skilful than average. This bias can be discerned when comparing perceptions of personal preparedness with levels of preparedness the respondents attribute to other community members. Overall, the mean level of personal preparedness was recorded at 2.02, whereas that attributed to other members of the community was recorded at 2.32.

This bias has significant implications for public hazard education. While people may appreciate need for mitigation, they attribute the need to other members of the community. Because they assume that messages are directed to others, this reduces both their perceived need for personal preparedness and their attentiveness to information presented as part of a risk communication or public education program. If all members of the community are doing this (as indicated by the fact that all respondents are rating their own preparedness as being better than that of others) everybody assumes that risk communication information is intended for others, reducing collective levels of preparedness.

This is not an easy issue to deal with, as it is a relatively enduring aspect of human psychological defences for dealing with significant threats. Furthermore, the recommendations for increased consultative and participative actions to increase people's motivation can, as a consequence of group polarization, increase the prevalence of unrealistic optimism bias. Thus, it is important to bear these processes in mind when estimating the effectiveness of risk reduction strategies, particularly in regard to the continuing presence of residual risk.

The data suggest that little benefit will accrue from increasing the perceived accuracy of forecasts. Overall, some 93 % of respondents believed in the accuracy of forecasts. A key problem is the fact that most people listen to forecasts only once a day. This limits the likelihood of people hearing a warning that is issued at any other time. Additional research into other media habits would be required to build a comprehensive picture of community access to warnings at other times of day. The general habit of listening to one forecast a day may account for data reporting that, overall, only 46 % of respondents received a warning (this ranged from a low of 29 % to a high of 56 %). Examination of the timing and media used to provide warnings needs further investigation.

The data also suggest a need to examine different ways of presenting information on this hazard. Even actual experience of the hazard appears to have had limited success in motivating people to reduce risk. However, the absence of pre-event data on these variables makes it difficult to assess whether people's perception of risk has changed as a consequence. Notwithstanding, current level of precursor or motivational variables have not been raised enough induce people to carry out household actions to reduce risk. Thus, an event occurring next year would likely have similar effects. It is possible that these data reflect relatively the low levels of loss and damage and the satisfaction of those whose experienced losses with their insurance provider. This could also lead to a normalisation bias-people think they can deal effectively with a future event on the basis of this experience. If this is the case, they are unlikely to adopt any actions to reduce the risk. Overall, these data suggest that motivation to adopt risk reduction measures is low. In the short term, this suggests more stress is needed on affecting people's behaviour during the time between the warning and the hazard occurrence (i.e., things that people could do within hours-for example, remove valuables from the ground floor, or protect septic tanks).

Overall, intention to prepare is present at very low levels, and levels of outcome expectancy and self efficacy-the variables mediating the conversion of motivation to intentions-are also low. Thus, estimates of residual social risk suggest that the response to future events would be similar to that observed in this event.