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Remediation of the FCC Mapua site

• Executive summary
• Introduction
• Ministry’s role and history
• Discussion
• Recommendations
• Appendices

Ministry’s role and history

It is not possible to review the role of the Ministry for Environment throughout the Mapua project without considering the context in which it operated. Many factors are important. The Ministry had a defined role under legislation. Many other agents had a role in developing and managing the project and in the development of, and compliance with, Resource Consent conditions. The unusual nature of the site (certainly for New Zealand) presented particular challenges and required an adaptive management approach. The nature of the contamination on the site is one that justifiably generates a great deal of community and public interest and attention. Finally, the Government (and more broadly the Parliament) had a continuing interest in the site, and in developing and promoting New Zealand technology.

In setting out the history of the site it is useful to examine several phases of the Ministry’s role –

• initial site investigation and the development of the consents;
• the process of transition from the Thiess Services contract to the Ministry holding the consent;
• management of the operation of the remediation process; and
• current status of the project.

Development of the Consent

Throughout the early phase of site characterisation and the development of the proposals the Ministry acted in its role as described in the Environment Act (1986)¹, assisting and advising the Minister in the operation of the Resource Management Act. It provided funding, research and advice in the development of remediation options, convening a Technology Review Panel. It part-funded the demonstration and evaluation of several optional technologies for the remediation of the site, to help meet the Government’s preference that the site should be remediated, rather than contained.

In 2001 TDC awarded Thiess, offering the MCD technology operated by EDL, the contract to develop the Resource Consent and Environmental Permit applications and to carry out the remediation. The Resource Consent application was lodged in 2003, and after consideration by the council, appeals and a consent hearing, was granted with amendments in November 2003.

Proof of Performance

As a condition of the consent, an expertise-based Peer Review Panel (PRP) was established.

“Peer Review Panel²

5. Prior to the commencement of any works the Consent Holder shall request the Council to appoint a Peer Review Panel, which shall include the nominated representative of the Environment and Planning Manager of the Council. The Peer Review Panel members shall be selected for their expertise in some or all of the following: Noise, air Quality, Vibration, Pesticide Contamination (including Persistent Organic Pollutants) Water Resources and Coastal Ecology.
6. The Role of the Peer Review Panel shall be to:
   1. Meet during the Proof of Performance Period to review, comment and make recommendations on the management plans (including the Remedial Action Plan);
   2. Meet after the Proof of Performance Period to review, comment and make recommendations on any changes to the management plans (including the Remedial Action Plan) and monitoring reports listed in condition 13
   3. Meet at no less than three monthly intervals; and
   4. Any recommendations of the Peer Review Panel shall be made to the Council’s Environment and Planning Manager and the council’s compliance coordinator. The Consent Holder will fund the operation of the Peer Review Panel.”

The PRP was intentionally established on the basis of specific technical expertise, although a representative of Thiess Services was included for information purposes³. The Site Auditor was also appointed to the panel.

The Ministry participated in this process. Council appointed a “MfE contaminated sites specialist, including experience with Persistent Organic contaminants, and advisor to MfE on the Mapua FCC project⁴” to the PRP.

At its first meeting the PRP received reports of progress and performance of the first week of the POP trails. There were issues of mechanical handling and the adjustment of reagent concentrations at this time. EDL flagged the potential use of other reagents⁵, although it is not clear from the report made to the PRP which other reagents might be used. The PRP expressed the clear view that the POP “needs to be (demonstrated)⁶ for defined operating conditions⁷”. That is, for the expected normal operations of the plant.

In the POP trials during normal operating conditions the results of air discharge monitoring showed operations well within the resource consent conditions. However, higher results were observed for most pollutants measured “after the feed auger jammed several times and the Air Pollution Control System was shut down as a consequence, although the dryer was still operating, so that the soil was overheated.⁸”. This operational irregularity was thought not to represent normal operating conditions.

This is consistent with the observations of testing carried out on 28,29 January 2002 and 11,12,13 March 2002 and reported in the AEE⁹ - “ The results show significantly higher organochlorine emissions from the dryer during the second round of monitoring compared to the first round. This is attributed to significantly higher temperatures of the drying air in the second set of tests as indicated by the baghouse exit temperatures”.

In combination, these reports suggest that certain plant operating conditions had consequences for organochlorine volatilisation and the emission of dioxin congeners. The key cause of such volatilisation and synthesis was attributed in the AEE to elevated dryer temperatures.

A second important implication of the results was to emphasise the importance of the Air Quality Management System as a key control, both in normal operating conditions (due to the potential volatilisation of contaminants) and during periods of process upset (where the carbon filters have the capacity to absorb organochlorines volatilized and dioxin potentially created in the compromised process.

The PRP provided comments on the Proof of Performance report, noting that Thiess had asked EDL to follow up the dioxin synthesis issue.

Thiess issued the Remediation Action Plan in July 2004.

Conclusion

The actions of the Ministry during the development of the Consent appear consistent with its legislated functions and expertise. Management and governance issues are unremarkable as the Ministry was acting within its established role.

The POP trials showed that during normal operating conditions the MCD plant could be run in conformance with the consent conditions. It also highlighted the importance of an effective air management control system in capturing volatilized components discharged from the MCD plant.

Transition of Consents to The Ministry

The withdrawal of Thiess Services from the project left TDC, the Ministry and the other project partners in a challenging position. The Ministry conducted significant investigations throughout July 2004 to determine the available options for the continued clean-up of the site. There were considerable disadvantages in leaving the site in its existing state. The Ministry had obligations to Government for the expenditure of the Contaminated Sites Remediation Fund, which had been the funding vehicle for the project. Further funding was vulnerable given that the Ministry had carried over appropriation for the site in previous years.

There was considerable ‘sunk’ effort and cost at this stage, all approvals had been prepared, and the treatment technology had been judged satisfactory. There had been an investment in community consultation, establishing community expectations. Detailed project planning had been completed and approved. Delays at this stage had the potential to cause a significant hiatus in the project.

In this period the Ministry considered options for contractors to continue site works, considering

• Securing another contractor to assume Thiess’ role (judged too likely to result in delays); and
• Appointing a site engineer and an earthworks contractor, potentially on an interim basis, under contract to MfE or TDC

The Ministry considered ‘Management Options’, distinguishing between MfE “runs the show” and TDC “runs the show”.

The Ministry also considered how it might manage the project internally should it adopt the role as consent holder and ‘manager’ of the remediation.

Ministry staff investigated to the extent possible the reasons for Thiess’ withdrawal. Multiple potential reasons were identified, many financial (including matters outside the control of any party, such as exchange rate variations). The combination of reasons cannot be known with any certainty, but clearly the financial issues would have been sufficient to influence Thiess, bound as they were to a fixed price contract.

Within the Ministry a ‘handover’ project plan¹⁰ was prepared by early August 2004, aimed at implementing a transition to the Ministry’s project management role. The plan included the review of all consent and contract documents, signing of an exit deed with Thiess, establishment of an understanding with TDC on funding and compliance, transfer of the resource consents, establishment of a Ministry project team, urgent recruitment or reappointment of external personnel and contractors, and the development of a communications plan.

The Ministry and TDC negotiated heads of agreement on 4 August 2004. These provided for

“MfE to remediate the Mapua site to the agreed standards set out in the former contract between Thiess and TDC dated October 2001, and in the related resource consents.

Tasman District Council agree to:

• Contribute a maximum of $2 million (plus GST) toward site remediation costs”.
• Pay $734, 000 (including GST) no sooner than 18 months (modified to 36 months) after completion of the remediation project as certified by the site auditor.”¹¹

The Ministry would be the Consent Holder; the remediation resource consents to be transferred from Thiess. All intellectual property relevant to the project was transferred to The Ministry. The heads of agreement also include a desire by TDC that the Ministry indemnify TDC in relation to the remediation project. This proved not to be acceptable to the Ministry.

Conclusion

In this phase, the evidence shows that the Ministry carried out appropriate ‘due diligence’ with respect to its risks, project structure and resources in assessing whether to assume responsibilities for the project.

Some key issues were not resolved at that time. The financial arrangements were not resolved between the Ministry and TDC, and there was no documented agreement between the Ministry and TDC regarding the compliance and monitoring design. Both these issues later contributed to difficulties and misunderstandings in carrying out the project.

The project relied on the detailed Thiess project documentation and approvals to plan site activity. Other elements of the project that reflected the Ministry’s broader responsibilities, such as governance, advice to the Minister, Mapua project funding and budgeting, project reporting and tracking, were dealt with using the Ministry’s established procedures.

This decision is a matter of governance and strategic direction for the Ministry. A clear ‘governance’ separation of the Mapua remediation project would have helped resolve a number of apparent conflicts in the Mapua project, and certainly have made the process of review and evaluation more effective. However, the strategic intent was to build the Ministry as a more action-oriented and responsive agency¹², and so integrating key projects into ‘Business as Usual’ management and governance is a key tool to achieve this new model.

The Ministry as a Consent Holder

The Ministry formally took over the Consents on 2 September 2004. It acted rapidly to establish interim contracts for the key site functions and supervision, and a long-term contract with EDL for the remediation technology. These short-term contracts were later confirmed with long-term contracts. The Ministry reported to the PRP “The new contracts clarify the responsibility for the environmental controls lies with the individual contractors¹³”. This is consistent with the Ministry project structure, which documents the interaction of the TDC (in its compliance function) with site management, not the Ministry itself.

The Ministry established a new reporting structure with EDL, requiring daily worksheets, work dockets, production details, and a formal monthly report.

It also established a health monitoring protocol for workers, having rewritten the Health and Safety documentation. This included lung and liver function tests, analysis of OCP in blood, personal air monitoring, and ‘fit for work’ assessments.

The Ministry was keen to keep the momentum of the project and carried out earthworks to provide sufficient soil for the MCD process to operate into January. The MCD operated using soil prepared for the Proof of Performance trials until mid October, before beginning to treat the soils more recently excavated from the site. These soils were wetter and less well mixed, and may have contributed to mechanical problems with the MCD process.

On 13 Jan 2005 there was a release of steam and soil from the MCD plant after maintenance operations. EDL did not notify TDC, the Ministry or the site manager EMS, but public complaints alerted TDC to the incident. The Ministry reported “EDL is not meeting its contract requirements for this”¹⁴ (ie EDL not reporting “significant air discharges”).

On 3 February 2005 stack emissions were tested. Results showed levels of OCP much higher than reported in the Proof of Performance Trial as representing normal operating conditions. However, a calculation of the Total Hazard Index showed that this met the consent criterion for human health exposure.

On 15 March 2005 the carbon filter malfunctioned and visible signs of leaking carbon were obvious. A site instruction to stop work was issued by Ministry representatives on the same day requesting the plant to shut down until repairs could be made¹⁵.

These issues were discussed at the PRP meeting in April. The Ministry reported to the meeting that a closer oversight of the operations of the MCD plant would take place. In clarifying the implications of this, the Ministry advises that

“This reference is to both a more active formal and informal site management practice adopted on the site. The site management team became more actively involved in visiting the EDL plant and in being actively aware of any incidents and decisions that may have an effect on site management and/or resource consent compliance. The site team could also use the more formal site instructions and other mechanisms open to it as required. The key was being more fully informed in order to be able to respond. There is no formal reference to this however”, and

“the site management team did become more actively involved in the maintenance of the Air Quality Control System, including ensuring the regular monthly changes of the carbon filter and documenting these in the site logs”.

The carbon filter was changed monthly from March 2005¹⁶.

On 7 April 2005 TDC wrote to the MfE Project Manager regarding the ‘failure to notify’ of significant emissions from the site, and their concerns about the performance of the carbon filter¹⁷. Specifically, TDC wrote “…we discovered that the carbon filter was repaired at Christmas time with chicken wire, so presumably had been malfunctioning for several weeks before 5 March 2005”. It also highlighted the exposure of the Ministry as the consent holder.

The Ministry responded to this letter, citing the ‘stop-work’ instruction on the day of the filter failure, providing air emissions data and a proposed methodology for further investigation to determine an appropriate maintenance period for the carbon filter.

On 4 May 2005 TDC raised the issue of the dryer temperature with the Ministry, referring to the consent condition and its rationale – to prevent the de novo formation of dioxins and to limit the volatilisation of OCP. Further letters from TDC followed, questioning the consistency of the filter design with the consent hearing, and requesting inlet and outlet OCP tests to confirm the efficiency of the filter.

In July the carbon filter again ‘disintegrated’ and required redesign to address corrosion of the supporting stainless steel basket.

At this time there was a change of personnel in the Ministry Project Team, following the loss of the Project Manager. The Project Manager position was not formally replaced. The Ministry advises “A project team approach was taken thereafter”¹⁸. I could not find documentation setting out the new arrangements for the project.

The meeting of the PRP on 2 August heard that OCP in the air discharge continued to be a compliance issue, and of the failures of the carbon filter. The PRP expressed concern about the repeated failure of the carbon filter, and explored the weight that could be given to its recommendations. The Ministry representative advised that information was being collected and expert advice sought.

On 16 September 2005 the Ministry advised TDC that the MCD plant was shut down for modification of the air emissions control system, with the intent of addressing the air discharge issues.

The Ministry commissioned Kingett Mitchell Ltd to carry out an audit of the Air Emission Control System. This was carried out in September and reported to the Ministry in October¹⁹. The report noted that there had recently been work to reconfigure the air management system. Several recommendations were made. The report was sent to both TDC and EDL for their comment. EDL raised a number of issues regarding the ’best’ configuration of the air management system, and the practical issues of reconfiguration.

On 25 Novmber 2005 Dr Craig Stevenson joined the PRP, introducing much-needed advice to the group. He prepared a presentation on the air emission system for the meeting of 2 December 2005. The reconfiguration of the air management system appeared to have controlled the acidity in the discharge, and therefore the carbon filter was more secure. He suggested that volatile organic carbon compounds (VOCs) could be saturating the filters, even before the monthly change-out period. He recommended VOC sampling before and after the carbon filter, as had the Site Auditor in the April PRP meeting. The Ministry agreed to investigate a method to measure VOCs.

Dioxin generation was discussed. Dr Stevenson presented a plausible mechanism for dioxin generation, but concluded that dioxin generation under the present configuration was “not a high risk”.

The PRP considered it needed to express its concerns about the air emission matters and there was some discussion at the meeting about the role of the PRP and the way its recommendations are dealt with. It formalised its views in a recommendation agreed at the meeting…

“The PRP is very concerned about the risks of discharges from the air emission system from OCPs and dioxins, the lack of supporting monitoring to assess the effectiveness of the carbon filter (given recent failures) and the lack of any redundancy in the air emission system. The monitoring of VOC and stack efficiency should take place before the next scheduled 3 monthly stack test.”²⁰

The carbon filter was sampled in January 2006 for OCP and VOC and estimates of the time taken to saturate the filter with VOC were discussed.

The problems of measuring the dryer temperature and the relevance of measurements at various points in the system were discussed at the PRP in February 2006. EMS checked the outlet temperature “3-4 times a day”, and had found that outlet temperatures in the range 97-108oC. Temperatures in the chamber varied from 196-210oC. The PRP records show “…the PRP was not able yet to resolve how to achieve compliance with the condition of 120oC cutoff at the inlet of the dryer, and how to guarantee that dioxins are not being formed (which was one of the purposes of the consent condition).”²¹ Key issues were the variability of temperature throughout the system, and the associated implications for OCP volatilisation and dioxin synthesis; and the energy required to dry the soil as stockpiled.

In May clear ‘best practice’ advice for filter management was summarized for the PRP - “…carbon…changed monthly, the used carbon analysed for OCPs, a running total of the OCP input calculated with 240kg of OCPs being the theoretical limit, maintaining at least a 300kg charge of carbon, and keeping the dryer temperatures monitored and within current bounds to avoid risk of significant dioxin formation.”²².

The PRP also recommended at this meeting that dioxin was tested at the top and bottom of the filter charge, to determine its efficiency in removing dioxin.

The Ministry requested a consolidation of all TDC’s requests for monitoring so that it was clear what additional monitoring was being requested. TDC sent a letter to the Ministry on 15 June 2006 outlining the outstanding issues and requests for further monitoring. In particular, it requested that “the carbon from the top and bottom of the filter is tested for dioxin, at the next carbon change (in June 2006)²³”.

The Ministry responded formally on 7 July 2006. It analysed each request and prepared a detailed response. In summary, where the Ministry considered there was clear evidence for an issue, this was acted on whether or not it was strictly required by the consent (eg benzene sampling).

On the issue of dioxin sampling, the Ministry argued that expert evidence from the PRP suggested that dioxin formation would be low or negligible, and that it was therefore not necessary. Neither was it a consent condition. An additional reason is expressed in internal emails “continuing requests for investigations for dioxins implies that there is a problem. The requests and investigations can create concern when there are no grounds for concern. MfE will not assist with an approach which created unnecessary concerns over dioxins”.²⁴

A second key issue debated at this time was the consent condition 17, that “the consent shall be carried out in general accordance with the Consent Holders Assessment of Environmental Effects dated May 2003, supporting documentation lodged with the AEE and the evidence presented at the consent hearing.”

TDC argued that the current configuration of the air management system was not ‘in general accordance’ and did not reflect best practice. It provided Dr Craig Stevenson’s recommendations on the carbon filter and its maintenance. The Ministry had previously commissioned a report²⁵ on the general configuration of the system to advise on best practice. While the system certainly differed from that proposed in the AEE and the hearing, it was not substantially different from that used in the Proof of Performance trials, which were accepted by TDC prior to the transfer of the permits to the Ministry.

TDC informed the Ministry on 26 July 2006 that it intended to sample the carbon filter for both dioxin and OCPs. The Ministry argued at the time that it was not related to a consent condition, and so TDC’s “proposal to take carbon samples is unauthorised”²⁶.

Ministry representatives and TDC met in August, and resolved that TDC did have the legal right to test. TDC was formally advised on 13 September²⁷ of the Ministry’s willingness to allow TDC to take samples, while the letter expressed reservations held by EDL and the Ministry about the interpretation of results. TDC was to pay for this sampling.

The results of the sampling were analysed by Dr Craig Stevenson, who concluded “ Overall, this testing of dioxins in activated carbon from the air pollution control filter provides a very good assurance of a clearly acceptable low level of dioxin formation in the drier, and very low levels of dioxins in the emissions from the carbon filter.” He calculated that the average dioxin concentration in the gas discharged from the system was 0.0009 ng TEQ/m3, or about 1% of the European Commission limits for incineration. The efficiency of the filter was 95%. This result provided confirmation of the conclusion of the POP report that dioxins would not be generated under normal operating conditions.

It has also been suggested that the Ministry ignored expert advice on potential groundwater contamination. In May 2006 the PRP discussed the possibility of a groundwater plume and included an action item “MfE to consider monitoring to track the contaminant plume…in a larger network of bores south of the site.” This was formalised in the “Outstanding issues and requests for further monitoring” letter from TDC on 15 June 2006. The Ministry sought clarification of what the precise requirements were. This was provided by TDC on 8 August 2006, expanding on the recommendations of the PRP. The identified plume of ammonia and nitrate was seen as a possible indication that contaminants were migrating off-site, and other contaminants of greater concern might follow.

The proposal for monitoring the plume was discussed at the PRP meeting in November 2006 leading to an action item: “MfE to discuss offsite groundwater contamination further with Peter Nadebaum, and consider implementing more fully Tasman District Council’s 8 June letter which suggested a monitoring process for tracking the groundwater plume.”

The change of reagents used in the MCD process (particularly the use of copper) was not anticipated in the resource consent process, but the use of copper sulfate as a reagent had the potential to introduce a new environmental concern. High copper levels have been recorded across the site, and the Site Auditor stressed the importance of reducing the rate of copper use to the contractor and the Ministry. Copper use in the process declined as the reagent mix and preparation was optimised. In assessing the significance of the copper found on the site is important to identify what chemical form of copper is present in the final soils. The ecotoxicity of copper and its leachability are strongly influenced by the chemical species present.

In June 2008 Dr Bill Glass completed his Final Report on Organochlorine Blood Monitoring, reporting this aspect of the health monitoring of site workers from the period 2005-2007. The key finding was that the levels of pp- DDT in blood tended to respond to on-site exposure in some staff. There was a high of variability in both the baseline conditions of staff, and their response over time. He indicated the importance of collecting baseline information for each individual, so that change can be measured from this baseline. It would be very difficult to interpret OCP results without baseline measurements.

During the project, there were calls for the Ministry to sample the blood levels of nearby residents for organochlorine pesticides. The Ministry did not agree to these calls. In the light of the highly uncertain and variable baselines in the New Zealand population, it is unlikely that such sampling, partway through the project, could be related usefully to the exposure of the people tested.

Dr Glass made some specific recommendations and some more general suggestions for the future. These include sampling of baseline conditions for the families of on-site workers. Despite the suggestions of areas of improvement, he concluded, “given that this was the first remediation project the Ministry has undertaken, all-in-all I believe it was successfully carried out”.

Conclusion

The Ministry embarked on this phase of the project with most of the preparatory work effectively completed. In the conduct of the project, some key issues challenged the capacity of the Ministry. The lack of strong project management discipline led to a less formal project management structure later in the project. This may have led to more stretched resources for the project. The Project Leader was not replaced and a “team management” approach adopted.

The lack of a clear understanding of compliance and monitoring requirements, particularly in the context of the evolving nature of these requirements, led to some misunderstandings between partners in carrying out the project. Predictably, it was the unexpected that raised problems. For example, the change of MCD plant reagents, the debate about the effectiveness of the air management system, and the recommendations of the PRP all raised management challenges.

While the Ministry was seen to be obstructive in some areas, it went beyond the requirements of the consent in a number of areas. Some of these it initiated itself. It appeared to make its own judgments of the validity of the ‘requests’ by TDC, and the views of the PRP. In many cases these judgments were correct, but the approach used by the Ministry contributed to tensions in relationships with other participants.

While there were some weaknesses in project management, documentation and approach used by the Ministry, it remained focused on conducting an effective clean-up of the site, pursuing the project to completion.

The view by TDC as the regulator of the Ministry as consent holder was that it behaved ‘like any other consent holder²⁸”. The circumstances of the project – the site complexity, the controversial nature of the project, the adaptive management required by the refinement of the technology used – suggest that success in managing the emerging environmental risks depended on a consent holder that was responsive and flexible. It might be expected that the ‘custodian’ of the RMA should behave in an exemplary, rather than a typical way.

Current Status

The Consents have now expired and the site has now been capped with clean soil and grassed.

There are some important actions that are required to finalise the project. The Site Validation Report is currently in draft form, and the Site Auditors Report, and Dilapidation Survey are required to be completed by the Ministry under the terms of the Financial Deed.

The Site auditor may

• Qualify its report and opinion
• Recommend restrictions upon the use of any part of the site; and
• Recommend further monitoring or work on the site.

It is premature to speculate on the results of these key reports, although it seems likely that the auditor will recommend further monitoring to assess the longer-term effects of the site. Restrictions on the use of parts of the site are acknowledged. TDC will apply limitations on land use via the planning process.

Conclusion

The Ministry has a clear process for the formal completion of the project under the terms of the Deed. However, there are elements of Ministerial action and decision-making that will continue. Recommendations on further action for the Ministry follow.

Financial Agreements

There has been some attention paid to the financial arrangements between TDC and the Ministry, and particularly the failure to sign the Mapua Financial Contribution Deed.

At the time that the Ministry assumed responsibility for the site, the Ministry and TDC had an existing Deed to pay for Stage 3 of the Thiess contract (the remediation). Thiess’ contract was for a lump sum of $NZ 4.6 million. The Deed agreed a 70:30 split, with TDC’s contribution capped at $NZ 2 million.

Notes of a meeting on 4 August 2004 to clarify heads of agreement document TDC’s desire to cap its contribution at 2 million, and further to seek that the Crown indemnify TDC.

A draft was prepared and sent to TDC on 23 August 2004, and comments returned in late September. Discussion on the wording of the Deed, and particularly the issue of liability continued.

A further meeting of the parties did not occur until 27 May 2005, in part due to the Ministry’s need to resolve the contracts for the delivery of the remediation. By this time the estimated cost of stage 3 was $10 million, and it was running well behind schedule. In late 2006 TDC delivered an updated second draft. The issue of indemnity was still problematic. By 25 May 2007 project costs were estimated to reach as much as $NZ13 million, and MfE proposed an amendment to increase TDC’s share of the costs. This was not concluded. While the issue of indemnity had not been agreed, the delays meant that there was opportunity to renegotiate the arrangements as the identified costs rose.

On 1 May 2008 the Ministry sent a ‘final version” of the Deed to TDC. However, TDC had identified additional contractors costs and proposed to alter the Deed to reflect these. The Ministry immediately sought advice from the Crown Law Office to determine its legal position. Crown Law’s advice is summarised in the following statement “From the documents you have provided, the agreements between MfE and TDC in relation to the funding of, and responsibility for, the project appear to have proceeded on an informal basis”²⁹.

The Deed was eventually signed on 8 September 2008.

Conclusion

The expenditure of significant funds relied on an informal understanding between the key funding bodies. However, the Ministry was accountable throughout to the Minister(s) and to the Parliament for its appropriations, and the TDC was undoubtedly aware of its exposure.

The material effect of the informality of this ‘partnership’ approach is difficult to determine. Perhaps a more active management of the financial arrangements may have changed the distribution of the relative contributions, noting that TDC has consistently maintained that its contributions were capped at $NZ 2 million.

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Last updated: 8 December 2008